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1 Introduction
Since the extraordinary successes of Jaws in the summer of 1975 and Star
Wars two summers later, the big Hollywood studios have increasingly cho-
sen to release their would-be blockbusters in the United States during the
summer period (starting Memorial Day weekend, at the end of May), when
a bigger audience is available (because kids are out of school, adults are
on vacation, and heat waves drive them all inside air-conditioned theaters).
This trend culminated in the summer of 2013 with the release of 31 movies
aiming at a large audience.1 Although summer 2013 outperformed the previ-
ous summer in terms of overall box-office revenues, it is not really surprising
that an important number of these 31 movies flopped.
To avoid a repeat of such a congested release schedule and its resulting
head-to-head competition, some studios decided to make summer 2014 start
earlier: Walt Disney, 21st Century Fox and Time Warner made their po-
tential blockbuster debut in April.2 They may have been inspired by some
previous successful releases that took place outside the summer months.3
Yet, even though the scheduling of movie releases looked smarter in 2014,
summer 2015 was congested again and the same is likely to go for 2016 with
speculations about a possible clash of superheroes in May.4
These recent events demonstrate that choosing release dates is a major
strategic issue for movie studios, which places them in a configuration that
resembles a game of chicken: all studios want to have their movies released in
periods of large audience and although none of them is willing to yield, they
all admit that spacing out releases is preferable. Release decisions are all the
more important that movie studios do not seem to compete in prices. It is
1Rampell (2013) reports that each of these 31 movies played on at least 3,000 screens
in the US; over the previous decade, only an average of 23.3 movies reached the same
distribution scale during the corresponding period.
2Respectively Captain America: The Winter Soldier, Rio 2, and Transcendence.
3For example, The Hunger Games in March 2012, Gravity in October 2013 or The
Lego Movie in February 2014.
4“Following the recent announcement that Captain America 3 was not moving from
the May 2016 release window despite the opening of WB’s Man of Steel sequel (dubbed
Batman vs. Superman), Warner Bros. president of domestic distribution, Dan Feldman,
basically told Bloomberg that Marvel can move their release because they have no plans
to do so: ‘It doesn’t make a lot of sense for two huge superhero films to open on the same
date but there is a lot of time between now and 5/6/16. However at this time, we are not
considering a change of date for Batman vs. Superman’.”(quoted in Kendrick, 2014)
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indeed observed that ticket prices are generally uniform and relatively stable
over time and across locations (see Orbach and Einav, 2007, and Chisholm
and Norman, 2012). As Einav (2007, pp. 127) summarizes, “[w]ith virtually
no price competition, the movie’s release date is one of the main short-run
vehicles by which studios compete with each other.”
Other cultural industries share the same features: no (or limited) price
competition, demand seasonality and strategic release decisions. Take for
instance the market for literary works in France. First, price competition
was neutralized in 1981 when a Fixed Book Price law was passed; second, the
end-of-year holidays are traditionally the period when book sales culminate;
third, the lion’s share of novels are released during the ‘Rentre´e litte´raire’, a
period that spans from late August to early September.5 Inevitably, clashes
among closed competitors become more likely during this congested period,
which may drive editors to reschedule the release date of their book.6 Similar
patterns can be observed for the release of video games or music albums.
The question that naturally arises is how producers of cultural goods
can turn the odds in their favor in this game of chicken. Product prean-
nouncement may be a strategy. For instance, Keyes (2014) reports that
“Marvel studios has mapped out films all the way to 2028” adding, how-
ever, that “[t]he roadmap of projects doesn’t necessarily mean that specific
films are locked in with potential dates or a strict release order.” Yet, one
can doubt that producers have sufficient commitment power to make such
pre-announcements credible. Moreover, if an announcement turns out to
be (intentionally or unintentionally) false, the producer’s reputation may be
damaged.7
Producers of cultural goods must thus find other means to scare off the
5Two reasons drive editors to favor this period; first, they want to initiate positive
word-of-mouth for their books before the end-of-year holidays; second, they want to place
their books in good order for the various book prizes (e.g., ‘Prix Goncourt’) that are
awarded from September to November (as winning one of these prizes may substantially
boost sales).
6As anecdotal evidence, in Belgium in October 2012, two books about the royal family
were ready to be released at the same period but one of them made the choice to delay the
release (the publisher gave several reasons but observers suggested that the main reason
was to avoid head-to-head competition with the other book on the same topic that was
released a few days before).
7The derisive term ‘vaporware’ is used to designate such announced products that are
released far behind schedule (or never released); Dietz (2011) lists vaporware video games.
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competition and keep the most profitable release dates for themselves. In
this paper, we argue that promotion budgets can play this role. We first
develop our argument in a simple game-theoretic model, where two produc-
ers of cultural goods choose their promotion budget before simultaneously
setting the release date of their good. Assuming that the size of the poten-
tial demand decreases with time and that the life cycle of goods has a given
length, we show that two equilibrium configurations are possible: either
both producers release their good immediately (i.e., when demand peaks),
or one producer releases its good at the peak while the other producer only
releases its good once the life cycle of the first good is over. Interestingly,
in the equilibrium with staggered release, the first-mover invests more in
promotion than the second-mover (whereas in the equilibrium with simulta-
neous release, both producers invest the same amount). As a larger budget
allows a producer to ‘steal’ part of the demand at the rival’s expense, we
see that investing heavily in promotion may allow a producer to credibly
secure the most profitable release date for itself. Our model also allows us
to identify a number of factors that make staggered release more likely (and,
conversely, simultaneous release less likely). In particular, we expect pro-
ducers of cultural goods to space out more their releases if their goods are
closer substitutes (e.g., because they belong to the same genre), if demand
does not decay too fast after the peak, and if investment in promotion is
less costly.
In the second part of the paper, we apply our theoretical model to the
movie market and we bring its predictions to the data. Using information
from Box Office Mojo, we compiled a dataset of more than 1500 American
movies released over a thirteen-year period (from January 1, 2001 to De-
cember 31, 2013) in ten countries. For each movie, the data includes the
following information: the official release dates, total box-office revenues,
production costs, the genre of the movie, whether it is a sequel (or not), and
the studio producing and distributing the movie. To verify whether movies
with bigger budgets tend to be released closer to the demand peaks, we first
identify the demand peaks in each season in the various countries. Then,
we define our dependent variable as the number of weeks that separates the
release date of movie m from the nearest demand peak. As independent
variables, we include the budget of movie m, as well as the sums of the
budgets of the other movies released during the same week, distinguishing
4
between movies of the same genre as m and movies of other genres; the
last two variables are meant to measure the influence of competition. Fi-
nally, we regress this model using an OLS approach, controlling for country
fixed-effects.
Our empirical analysis largely confirms the predictions of the theoretical
model. In particular, we show that movies with larger budgets tend to
be released closer to the seasonal peaks. We also find that an increase in
the total budgets of competing movies moves the release date closer to the
seasonal peak, and that this effect is larger for movies of the same genre
than for movies of other genres. A number of robustness checks allow us to
establish the validity of these results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review the literature and stress the novelty of our contribution. In Sec-
tion 3, we develop our theoretical model, from which we draw a number of
hypotheses that we test and discuss in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Related literature
Movies are, by far, the cultural goods that have attracted the largest body
of academic research, both in economics and in marketing. This is not
surprising given the economic importance of the movie industry, the set of
interesting issues that it raises (because of its complex production process
and its uncertain demand) and the large availability of data sources. The
purpose of this section is by no means to review this literature.8 Our goal
here is to show that, despite the extensive research on the movie industry,
very few papers have considered the strategic aspect of release decisions and
no paper so far (to the best of our knowledge) has dealt with the issue that
we study in this paper, namely the interplay between budgeting and release
decisions in a competitive setting.
A busy strand of the empirical literature on movies aims at estimating
the demand for movies and the determinants of box-office revenues. Among
these determinants, the simultaneous release of similar movies (same genre
or same targeted audience) is shown to have a negative effect (see Ainslie
et al., 2005, Basuroy et al., 2006, and Calantone et al., 2010). Recently,
8We refer the interested reader to the complementary surveys of Eliashberg et al.
(2006), Hadida (2009) and McKenzie (2012).
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Guttierez-Navratil et al. (2014) study to what extent box-office revenues are
affected by the temporal distribution of rival films. Using data on movies
released in five countries (USA, UK, France, Germany and Spain), they
show that the effect of contemporary rivals is always larger than that of
previously released movies or future rivals.
In the minority of papers that adopt an industrial organization perspec-
tive and explicitly incorporate strategic issues, a number of papers consider
release decisions as the main strategic variables. However, the focus is often
on the so-called ‘release window’, i.e., the sequence of release dates of a given
movie through different distribution channels (movie theater, on-demand,
DVD, cable TV, terrestrial TV). These papers argue that decisions about
the release window are mainly driven by three effects: piracy (Danaher
and Waldfogel, 2012), word-of-mouth (Moul, 2007) and substitution across
versions (Calzada and Valetti, 2012). The analyses of the optimal release
window are either purely empirical or, if theoretical, they adopt a monopoly
framework. A notable exception is Dalton and Leung (2013), who consider
another strategic determinant of the choice of release window, namely the
incentive for studios to avoid releasing blockbusters at the same dates.9
Only a few papers study, as we do, studios’ choice of the premiere release
date in a competitive setting. The closest in spirit to our paper is Krider
and Weinberg (1998). They consider the competition between two movies
in a share attraction framework and conduct an equilibrium analysis of the
product introduction timing game; they test their model examining the 24
major movies released during the 1990 summer season. Our analysis goes
much further by endogenizing the budget decision in the theoretical model
and by testing the results on a much wider dataset. Close to our empirical
part is Einav (2010), who develops an empirical model to study the movie
release date timing game; he finds that released dates are too clustered
around big holiday weekends and that box office revenues would increase
if distributors shifted some holiday released by one or two weeks. Finally,
Cabral and Natividad (2015) show, both theoretically and empirically, the
importance for a movie’s future success of leading the box office during the
opening weekend (because being number one induces a greater awareness
9They use a discrete choice release gap decision game model to disentangle the impacts
of this strategic effect from the effects of piracy and word-of-mouth. Their results sug-
gest that all three factors have an economically significant impact on distributors’ release
window decision.
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among potential viewers); although this paper does not directly consider
release decisions, it stresses another reason for which studios are likely to
fight to release their movies close to demand peaks.
As for other cultural goods, we only found one paper that relates to our
analysis. Engelsta¨tter and Ward (2013) study the strategic release decisions
of video game publishers. The results of their empirical analysis suggest
that publishers adjust the release dates of their games so as to avoid weeks
where competition within their niche is strong. No link is made, however,
between release decisions and promotion or marketing expenditures.
3 A theoretical model of competition in cultural
industries
In this section, we present our theoretical model, which depicts a two-stage
competition between two producers of cultural goods. We first describe the
setting and discuss the relevance of our assumptions. Then, proceeding by
backward induction, we analyze the (short-term) choice of release dates
before turning to the (long-term) choice of promotional efforts.
3.1 The setting
Our objective is to build a reasonably simple model that captures what we
believe are the main features of several cultural industries: (i) the absence
of price competition; (ii) a seasonal and fast-decaying demand; and (iii)
intertwined promotion and release decisions.
Regarding the first point, we observe that in contrast with most other
industries, price is not the main strategic variable for cultural goods. As ar-
gued in the introduction, this may be due to specific legislations or industry-
wide agreements that fix prices (as is common for books in Europe; see, e.g.,
Ringstad, 2004), or because prices are chosen by third parties in accordance
with their own strategic motives (as is the case for movie tickets).10
10Einav (2007, p. 129) explains that the motion picture industry “is dominated by
the major studios that have integrated production and distribution”, whereas “with few
exceptions, exhibitors are not vertically integrated with producers or distributors”(vertical
disintegration is even the rule in the U.S. after a series of court orders that were taken in
the late 1940s). McKensie (2008, p. 80) explains that exhibitors “have an incentive to hold
down (relatively speaking) all ticket prices in order to increase the demand for popcorn
(and other concessions).”Hartmann and Gil (2009) establish empirically that exhibitors do
7
As far as the shape of demand is concerned, seasonality plays an im-
portant part for many cultural goods. There are periods of the year that
are more conducive to consuming cultural goods, because of availability (va-
cations, holidays), climate (for instance, air-conditioned theaters are more
attractive during the hot summer days), or a specific context (such as upcom-
ing awards or prizes).11 Another characteristic of the demand for cultural
goods is that it is usually short-lived as consumers have a strong taste for
novelties.12
The seasonal and transient nature of demand for cultural goods make
release decisions highly strategic. As Cartier and Liarte (2012, p. 17) write:
“[t]o ensure the success of new cultural offerings, companies are encouraged
to choose a release date that corresponds to a particularly favourable time
slot in terms of demand.”Yet, as all producers make the same reasoning and
as cultural goods are inherently experience goods, release decisions cannot
be decoupled from promotion decisions.13
The interplay between promotion and release decisions lies at the heart of
our model. We consider indeed the competition between two cultural goods
supplied by two different producers.14 Producers (indexed by i, j ∈ {1, 2})
compete in two stages. At period 0, they choose their promotion budget
bi, bj ∈ [0, 1]. At the end of period 0, after observing the budgets, they
choose the release date of their good, ti, tj ≥ 1, where ti = 1 (resp. ti > 1)
indeed resort to price discrimination through metering (theaters can ‘meter’ the surplus
that can be extracted from a customer by how much of popcorn and other concessions
they demand).
11As for movies, the usual demand peaks are the festive season, early May and the
summer, with the addition of public holidays (we return in detail on this in Section 4).
Demand for books also peaks at the end of the year (see, e.g., Gaffeo et al. (2008) for
an empirical confirmation); the same applies for video games, whose demand also peaks
when the school period is over (as reported by Engelsta¨tter and Ward, 2013).
12Regarding movies, Einav (2007, p. 129) reports that “the first week accounts for
almost 40% of total domestic box-office revenues on average.”As for video games, En-
gelsta¨tter and Ward (2013, p. 3) write that “[s]ales for an individual product are strongest
immediately after launch but fall quickly.”
13In our analysis, promotion will be widely understood as any activity aimed at captur-
ing the attention of consumers and at signaling the quality of the cultural good and/or
its potential fit to the tastes of the consumers; that is, promotion encompasses not only
media advertising and other marketing tools (point of sale display, public relations, event
planning, etc) but also the hiring of famous cast or director or costly special effects for
movies, or higher quality graphics for video games.
14We discuss in Section 4.3 the case where the same producer supplies the two goods.
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means that the good is released at the start of (resp. later in) the sales
period.15
The number of consumers (readers, viewers, or gamers) that a particular
good attracts at a particular date depends on a number of factors: (i) the
budget decisions of the producers; (ii) the number of goods on sales at the
same date; (iii) the degree of similarity between the two goods; and (iv) the
date itself. Letting ni (t, bi, bj) denote the expected number of consumers
for good i at date t given the budgets (bi, bj), we assume:
ni (t, bi, bj) =
{
h (1 + bi)Nt
−α if i is the only good on sale,
h (1 + bi − βbj)Nt−α if both goods are on sale,
(1)
with N > 0, h ≤ 12 , bi, bj ∈ [0, 1], α > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
The demand function (1) should be understood as follows. First, the
potential audience for any good at date t is equal to Nt−α, where N is the
number of consumers (each consumer may buy up to one unit of each good).
That is, the audience is the largest at date t = 1 (i.e., just after the budgets
have been spent) and then it decreases at rate α > 0 per unit of time, as
the interest for cultural goods fades away as time goes by.
Second, each good has an ex ante probability h ≤ 12 of being chosen by
any consumer. Producer i can increase this ex ante probability by spending
more on promotion, i.e., by raising bi. The ex post probability is indeed given
by h (1 + bi) when good i is the only one on sale. However, if producer j
releases its good in the same period, the ex post probability that consumers
will decide to consume good i is given by h (1 + bi − βbj).16 That is, by
raising its budget (bj), producer j makes it less likely that good i will be
chosen.17 The influence of the other producer’s budget depends on the
15This sequence of decision corresponds to what is observed in the movie industry: as
noted by Vanderhart and Wiggins (2001), the advertising campaign starts before the movie
release date and culminates at the time the movie is released. Einav (2002) also notes that
distributors tend to pre-announce the release date of their movies so as to scare off the
competition, and that this practice is more common for movies with larger budgets. This
suggests again that budget decisions are made before release decisions and with a view to
influence them. In the model, we assume that once release dates are chosen, they cannot
be modified at a later stage. In reality, as reported, e.g., by Einav (2010) and Du¨rr et al.
(2014), it is not uncommon that studios reschedule the release dates of their movies. We
discuss this further in Section 4.3.
16The assumptions that h ≤ 1/2 and bi, bj ∈ [0, 1] make sure that this ex post probability
is positive and lower than one.
17We assume thus that promotion has, as defined by Marshall (1919), a “combative role”
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degree of similarity (or substitutability) between the two goods, which is
parametrized by β ∈ [0, 1]. At one extreme, β = 0 means that the goods are
totally differentiated, so that the audience for good i is not affected by the
budget of good j. At the other extreme, β = 1 means that the goods are
perfect substitute, so that if both producers choose the same budget, they
exactly neutralize each other. In the case of movies, an example for the
former case could be one teen comedy and one documentary on astrology,
while an example of the latter case could be two superhero movies telling
similar stories, and having equally popular casts.18
We assume that the two cultural goods have the same life cycle (i.e., the
period during which they are on sale), which is exogenously set to be equal
to s > 0.19 As prices are fixed, we assume that the margin that a producer
gets from each purchase of its good is fixed and equal to m > 0. Hence, the
profit of producer i at date t is given by
pii (t, bi, bj) =
{
mhN (1 + bi) t
−α if i is the only good on sale,
mhN (1 + bi − βbj) t−α if both goods are on sale.
We see that profits are scaled by the constant mhN . Without any loss
of generality, we can set mhN = 1 for the rest of the analysis. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting.20 We can now express
the flow of profits for producer i as a function of the promotional efforts and
as it helps producers steal each other’s audience. Cartier and Liarte (2012, p. 25) provide
an illustration of how movie studios resort to such combative promotion: “studios will
try to pre-empt the resources necessary for marketing and distributing a film (advertising
space, large number of prints made available to theatres, based on the film’s potential)
and will allocate a bigger budget than usual.”
18Under this formulation, if the two goods are on sale, the total number of consumers for
the two goods at a given date t is given by Tt ≡ Nt−αh (2 + (1− β) (bi + bj)) .When goods
are perfect substitutes (β = 1), Tt = 2hNt
−α; with h = 1/2, we have that Tt = Nt−α,
meaning that each consumer purchases exactly one good (the relative market share of
each good being determined by bi and bj). When goods are totally differentiated (β = 0),
Tt = hNt
−α (2 + bi + bj); with h = 1/2 and bi = bj = 1 (maximum promotion), we have
that Tt = 2Nt
−α, meaning that all consumers purchase both goods. Our formulation of
demand is thus based on the idea that consumers love variety.
19For instance, in the case of movies, Einav (2007, p. 130) notes that “[t]ypically, a
theater screens a movie for six to eight weeks.”
20Somehow, discounting is already included in the decaying interest for goods over time.
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release dates chosen by the two producers:
pii (ti, tj) =

pia ≡
∫ ti+s
ti
(1 + bi) τ
−αdτ
if 1 ≤ ti ≤ max {tj − s, 1} ,
pib ≡
∫ tj
ti
(1 + bi) τ
−αdτ +
∫ ti+s
tj
(1 + bi − βbj) τ−αdτ
if max {tj − s, 1} ≤ ti ≤ tj ,
pic ≡
∫ tj+s
ti
(1 + bi − βbj) τ−αdτ +
∫ ti+s
tj+s
(1 + bi) τ
−αdτ
if tj ≤ ti ≤ tj + s,
pid ≡
∫ ti+s
ti
(1 + bi) τ
−αdτ
if tj + s ≤ ti.
In segments pia and pid, producer i enjoys exclusivity, either because it re-
leases its good sufficiently before (pia) or sufficiently after (pid) producer j;
note that segment pia only appears if tj > 1 + s. In segments pib and pic, the
life cycles of the two goods overlap, with good i being released either before
(pib) or after (pic) good j.
We solve the game backwards for its subgame-perfect equilibria. Ac-
cordingly, we first consider the Nash equilibrium in terms of release dates
for given budgets.
3.2 Release decision
We show here that only two equilibrium configurations are possible: either
both producers release their good at the very first date (t∗1 = t∗2 = 1) or
one producer releases its good immediately while the other producer waits
for the end of the life cycle of the first to release its own, i.e., t∗i = 1 and
t∗j = 1 + s. We call the former configuration “simultaneous release” and
the latter “staggered release”. We establish this result with the help of the
following two lemmas. (All proofs are mostly technical and are therefore
relegated to the appendix.)
Lemma 1 Producer i’s best response to tj ≥ 1 is either t∗i (tj) = 1 or
t∗i (tj) = tj + s.
According to Lemma 1, the best conduct for a producer is to release its
good either immediately or just after the other producer’s good ceases to be
sold. This result follows from the fact that segments pia, pib, and pid decrease
with ti, while segment pic reaches its largest value at one of the extremities
of the zone where it is defined (i.e., at either ti = tj or ti = tj + s).
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We now show that if the other producer sufficiently delays the release of
its good, then it is best to release immediately.
Lemma 2 If tj ≥ 1 + s, then producer i’s best response is t∗i (tj) = 1.
This result is very intuitive: if the other producer releases its good after
date t = 1 + s, it is possible to avoid upfront competition for the full life
cycle by releasing one’s good sufficiently earlier than the other producer
does; moreover, as interest decays with time, it is optimal to release the
good as soon as possible, i.e., at date t = 1.
While Lemma 1 suggested that four equilibrium configurations were pos-
sible (as each producer’s reaction function is made of two dates), Lemma 2
discards one possibility: both firms releasing their good at date t = 1 + s
cannot be an equilibrium. There does remain three possibilities: simulta-
neous release (t∗1 = t∗2 = 1) and staggered release (t∗1 = 1 and t∗2 = 1 + s,
or t∗1 = 1 + s and t∗2 = 1). To establish the conditions under which one or
the other configuration emerges at equilibrium, we introduce the following
pieces of notation:
v1 ≡
∫ 1+s
1
τ−αdτ =
{
(1+s)1−α−1
1−α for α 6= 1,
ln (1 + s) for α = 1,
vs ≡
∫ 1+2s
1+s
τ−αdτ =
{
(1+2s)1−α−(1+s)1−α
1−α for α 6= 1,
ln (1 + 2s)− ln (1 + s) for α = 1.
These values should be interpreted as follows: recalling that mNh is set
equal to 1, v1 (resp. vs) is the expected profit for a good released at date
t = 1 (resp. t = s) when is the only one on sale during the whole life cycle
and when budgets are zero. Naturally, as interest for goods decays over time,
we have that v1 > vs. It is also clear that both v1 and vs decrease with α:
as demands decays faster, the cumulated audience decreases. Also, the ratio
vs/v1 decreases with α.
Suppose that tj = 1. Then producer i’s best response is to choose ti = 1
if and only if pib (1, 1) ≥ pic (1 + s, 1), or∫ 1+s
1
(1 + bi − βbj) τ−αdτ ≥
∫ 1+2s
1+s
(1 + bi) τ
−αdτ ⇔
(1 + bi − βbj) v1 ≥ (1 + bi) vs ⇔
(1 + bi)β0 ≥ βbj ,
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where β0 ≡ 1 − vs/v1. The threshold β0 can be interpreted as follows: in
the worst-case scenario where tj = bj = 1 and bi = 0, producer i prefers
simultaneous release (yielding (1 − β)v1) to staggered release (yielding vs)
if β ≤ β0. With this interpretation in mind, one understands easily that
the latter inequality is always satisfied if β ≤ β0. We can therefore already
conclude that when the two goods are not too similar (i.e., when β ≤ β0),
simultaneous release is the only equilibrium configuration for any pair of
promotional efforts.
When goods are closer substitutes (i.e., when β > β0), then four equilib-
rium configurations are possible, as illustrated in the three panels of Figure
1 and characterized in the next proposition.21
Proposition 1 (1) For β ≤ β0 = 1 − (vs/v1), (t∗1, t∗2) = (1, 1) for all b1,
b2 ∈ [0, 1]2. (2) For β0 < β < 2β0, we have (t∗1 (b1, b2) , t∗2 (b1, b2)) ∈
{(1, 1)} if ββ0 b2 − 1 ≤ b1 ≤
β0
β (1 + b2) ,
{(1, 1 + s)} if b1 ≥ β0β (1 + b2) ,
{(1 + s, 1)} if b1 ≤ ββ0 b2 − 1.
(3) For β > 2β0, we have (t
∗
1 (b1, b2) , t
∗
2 (b1, b2)) ∈
{(1, 1)} if ββ0 b2 − 1 ≤ b1 ≤
β0
β (1 + b2) ,
{(1, 1 + s)} if b1 ≥ max
{
β
β0
b2 − 1, β0β (1 + b2)
}
,
{(1 + s, 1)} if b1 ≤ min
{
β
β0
b2 − 1, β0β (1 + b2)
}
,
{(1, 1 + s) , (1 + s, 1)} if β0β (1 + b2) ≤ b1 ≤ ββ0 b2 − 1.
We see from Proposition 1 and the top-right panel of Figure 1 that stag-
gered release (t∗i = 1, t
∗
j = 1 + s) requires two conditions: on the one hand,
the two goods must be sufficiently similar (β > β0) and, on the other hand,
the producers must have chosen relatively dissimilar budgets. To be more
precise, a producer may force the rival to postpone the release of its good by
21Krider and Weinberg (1998) reach a similar result using a slightly different timing
game. These results are also consistent with what Einav (2007, p. 129) concludes from his
observation of the US motion picture industry: “The two important considerations for the
release date are the strong seasonal effects in demand and the competition that will be
encountered throughout the good’s run. Typically, goods with higher expected revenues
are released on higher (perceived) demand weekends, and there is a tradeoff between the
seasonal and the competition effects.”
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Figure 1: Equilibrium release dates
choosing a budget that is sufficiently larger than the rival’s. The required
difference in budgets becomes smaller as goods become closer substitutes.
At some point (β > 2β0), staggered release may occur at equilibrium even if
both producers choose the same budget; in that case, the similarity between
the goods is so large that avoiding simultaneous release is the main moti-
vation for both producers, resulting in the coexistence of the two staggered
equilibria.
3.3 Budgeting decision
Our goal is to analyze how producers choose the budget for their good,
anticipating the equilibrium release dates that will ensue. We assume that
14
costs are convex: C (bi) = (γ/2) b
2
i , where γ > 0 is an inverse measure
of the efficiency of the promotion technology. If β ≤ β0, the first stage
is extremely simple as a unique equilibrium obtains in the second stage.
Firm i chooses its budget bi to maximize (1 + bi − βbj) v1 − (γ/2) b2i . The
optimum is bi = v1/γ. To guarantee bi ≤ 1, we assume that γ > v1. At
the other extreme, when β > 2β0, a full characterization of the first-stage
equilibrium is not possible as there exist couples (b1, b2) leading to subgames
where multiple equilibria obtain, meaning that producers cannot predict the
ensuing equilibrium release dates. In what follows, we rule out this case
by assuming that 2β0 ≥ 1.22 We therefore focus here on the case where
β0 < β ≤ 1.
3.3.1 Equilibrium with simultaneous release
If simultaneous release is the second-stage equilibrium, the producers invest
b1 = b2 = v1/γ and their profits are
piim1 = pi
im
2 =
(
1 + (1− β) v1
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
(
v1
γ
)2
.
Two conditions are needed for this to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
First, it must be that (b1, b2) = (v1/γ, v1/γ) does indeed lead to (t1, t2) =
(1, 1) in the second stage. We see from Figure 1 that this is always true for
β0 < β ≤ 1 as the main diagonal is included in the area where (t1, t2) = (1, 1)
is the second-stage equilibrium.
The second condition is that no firm finds it profitable to trigger a change
of second-stage equilibrium from simultaneous to staggered release. Without
loss of generality, consider producer 1. If the second-stage equilibrium is
(1, 1 + s), then producer 1’s maximization program is maxb1 (1 + b1) v1 −
(γ/2) b21. So, the unconstrained optimum is v1/γ but this value does not
satisfy the constraint that must be met to be in the (1, 1 + s) zone.23 So,
producer 1 chooses the smallest value of b1 that meets the constraint, i.e.,
bd1 =
β0
β
(
1 +
v1
γ
)
.
22We show in Appendix 6.3 that this assumption is consistent with the observation that
the first week of exploitation of a movie accounts, on average, for almost 40% of the total
box-office revenues (Einav, 2007, p. 129).
23We need βb1 ≥ (1 + b2)β0. With b1 = b2 = v1/γ, the condition becomes v1/γ ≥
β0/ (β − β0), which is impossible under our assumptions that β < 2β0 and v1/γ < 1.
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The corresponding profit is computed as
pid1 =
(
1 +
β0
β
(
1 +
v1
γ
))
v1 − γ
2
(
β0
β
(
1 +
v1
γ
))2
.
Comparing piim1 and pi
d
1 allows us to state the following result.
Lemma 3 If β0 < β ≤ 1, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is (b∗1, b∗2; t∗1, t∗2) =
(v1/γ, v1/γ; 1, 1), involving simultaneous release, if and only if
v1
γ
≤ β0 β
√
2β − β + β0
β2 (2β − 1) + β0 (2β − β0) . (2)
It is clear that the LHS of condition (2) decreases if v1 decreases (which
can result from an increase in α) or if γ increases. As for the RHS, simple
derivations show that it increases if β decreases or if β0 increases. Recalling
that β0 = 1− vs/v1, we have that an increase in β0 is caused by a decrease
in the ratio vs/v1 (which can itself be caused by an increase in α). We can
therefore conclude that an equilibrium with simultaneous release is more
likely (i) the larger γ, (ii) the smaller β, and (iii) the larger α. All these
results confirm the intuition: (i) if it is more costly to produce and promote
a good (larger γ), forcing the rival to delay the release of its good becomes
less profitable; (ii) if goods are less similar (smaller β), being sold at the
same time hurts less; (iii) if demand decays faster (larger α), simultaneous
release is more attractive even if it implies being sold at the same time.
3.3.2 Equilibrium with staggered release
Suppose that producer 1 releases its good at t1 = 1, and producer 2 at
t2 = 1 + s. As long as these release dates are maintained, it is easily seen
that the two producers will choose their budget as (b1, b2) = (v1/γ, vs/γ),
leading to the following profits:
pist1 =
(
1 +
v1
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
(
v1
γ
)2
, pist2 =
(
1 +
vs
γ
)
vs − γ
2
(
vs
γ
)2
.
For these strategies to be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium, it must
first be the case that the budgets (b1, b2) = (v1/γ, vs/γ) generate (1, 1 + s)
as second-stage equilibrium. From Proposition 1, this is so as long as
v1
γ
≥ β0
β
(
1 +
vs
γ
)
. (3)
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Second, we must check that no producer has an incentive to choose a
budget that would lead to another second-stage equilibrium. It is first easy
to show that the producer that releases its good first does not have any
profitable deviation. This result is not surprising as releasing its good at
date t = 1 and facing no competition appears as the best possible scenario.
Consider now the producer that releases its good at date t = 1+s (producer
2 here). Referring to Figure 1, we see that two deviations are theoretically
possible: producer 2 can change the equilibrium release dates either to (1, 1)
or to (1 + s, 1). However, we show in the appendix that the latter option
is never feasible. As for the deviation to (1, 1), we show that it is not only
feasible but it can also be profitable. To make this deviation not profitable,
condition (4) must be imposed, which is more stringent than condition (3).
The next lemma summarizes our results.
Lemma 4 If β0 < β ≤ 1, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is
(
b∗i , b
∗
j ; t
∗
i , t
∗
j
)
=
(v1/γ, vs/γ; 1, 1 + s), involving staggered release, if and only if
v1
γ
≥ 2β0
β20 + 2 (β − β0)
. (4)
In terms of comparative statics, we expect the opposite results than in
the previous case: the factors that make staggered release more likely should
be those that make simultaneous release less likely. That is, staggered re-
lease should be more likely if (i) producing a good is less costly, (ii) goods
are closer substitute, and (iii) demand does not decay too fast. The first
conjecture is clearly verified: if γ decreases, the LHS of condition (4) in-
creases, which makes the condition more likely to be satisfied. The second
and third conjectures are also verified.24
Combining Lemmata 3 and 4, we can now fully characterize the subgame-
perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the two-stage game.
Proposition 2 Suppose that producers choose first the budget for their good
and then decide when to release it. The subgame-perfect equilibrium (in
24Note first that as we assume that γ > v1, condition (4) can only be satisfied if
its RHS is smaller than unity. Some lines of computations establish that two necessary
conditions are β0 < 2 −
√
2 ' 0.586 (which is equivalent to vs/v1 ≥
√
2 − 1 ' 0.414)
and β > (β0/2) (4− β0); that is, staggered release can only emerge if demand does not
decay too fast and if goods are similar enough. Moreover, one also observes that the RHS
of condition (4) decreases with β and increases with β0, which reinforces the previous
findings.
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pure strategies) of this game is as follows. (a) If β ≤ β0 or if β0 < β ≤ 1
and condition (2) is satisfied, then both producers invest v1/γ and release
their good immediately. (b) If β0 < 2 −
√
2, (β0/2) (4− β0) < β ≤ 1 and
condition (4) is satisfied, then one producer invests v1/γ and releases its
good immediately, while the other producer invests vs/γ < v1/γ and releases
its good just after the life cycle of the first good is over.
Figure 2 depicts the results for β0 < β ≤ 1. It can be shown that the
RHS of condition (4) is always larger than the RHS of condition (2), as
represented on Figure 2. Hence, there exist configurations of parameters
where a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist. This
corresponds to intermediate values of v1/γ; that is, values of v1/γ that
are too large for simultaneous release to prevail (e.g., because promotion
is rather cheap, which induces producers to invest more so as to force the
other producer to delay), and too small for staggered release to prevail (e.g.,
because the audience is too condensed at the start of the life cycle). This
potential absence of pure-strategy equilibria can be seen as an indication of
the instability of competition in cultural goods markets.
  
v1
γ
  
β
  
β0
  
1
  
1
Simultaneous 
release 
Staggered 
release 
No equilibrium 
(in pure strategies) 
Figure 2: Subgame-perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies)
4 Empirical analysis
We choose to apply our theoretical model to the movie industry. This choice
is motivated by data availability and by our desire to contribute to an ex-
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isting body of empirical papers (see the discussion in Section 2).
The main testable empirical hypothesis that we can draw from our model
is that movie studios may decide to increase their budget as a way to secure
release close to demand peaks and discourage their rivals from doing the
same. We should therefore observe that:
(H1) Higher budgets explain release dates closer to demand peaks.
The model also shows that the interplay between budgets and release
dates strongly depends on the degree of substitutability between the movies:
the more similar the movies, the higher the incentive to increase the budget
so as to secure the earliest release date, leading to the following hypothesis:
(H2) The release date of a given movie is more sensitive to the budgets
of close competitors (movies of the same genre) than of distant competitors
(movies of other genres).
Finally, the model also suggests that studios set the same high budget in
the simultaneous release equilibrium, while they set different budgets in the
staggered release equilibrium (with the follower investing less). This finding
leads us to formulate a third hypothesis:
(H3) The distribution of budgets is characterized by both a higher mean and
a higher standard deviation in weeks closer to a demand peak.
We now want to test these hypotheses in depth on our entire data set.
In the rest of this section, we first describe the data that we use to perform
our empirical analysis; we then present our empirical strategy and describe
our results; finally, we discuss our results.
4.1 Data
The data (collected on the website Box Office Mojo) refers to American
movies released in ten countries25 between January 1, 2001 and December
31, 2013 for which production budgets are available. Our final database
comprises 1564 movies and 12904 valid observations (see Table 3). For
each of the 1564 movies, we know (i) the production budget, (ii) the official
release dates (for the countries where the movie was released), (iii) the genre
to which the movie belongs, (iv) whether or not the movie is a sequel of (a)
previous movie(s), and (v) the studio producing and distributing the movie.
25Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain,
USA/Canada, and United Kingdom.
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Three comments are in order regarding the data. First, the “production
budget refers to the cost to make the movie and it does not include mar-
keting or other expenditures.”26 Unfortunately, broadly available measures
of movies’ advertising expenditures are notoriously hard to find (see, e.g.,
Moul, 2008, p. 973). The absence of such data can be seen as a limitation
to test our hypotheses. In our model, we consider indeed budgets as instru-
ments to attract more viewers and, arguably, the main channel to do so is
to increase marketing and advertising expenditures. We believe, however,
that production budgets are a reasonable proxy for our purposes, as they
comprise expenditures (such as cast, director, special effects) that are as
relevant as marketing expenditures to increase the expected viewership of a
movie. Moreover, it is generally estimated that marketing budgets tend to
represent a constant proportion (about 50%) of production budgets.27
Second, to form sub-samples of relatively comparable sizes, we have
grouped movies in five main “genres”, namely Drama, Action, Suspense,
Comedy, and Other.28
Third, we construct eight binary variables to control for movie studios
(i.e., the seven major film studios and a composite variable, named Others
that comprises the smaller distributors).29
Tables 1 and 2 provide some descriptive statistics of the major variables.
In Table 1, we report the main characteristics of the 1546 movies in our sam-
ple. The mean and standard deviation of the (inflation-adjusted) production
budgets are $54.4 million and $53.1 million, respectively. Comparing movie
genres, we observe that movies in the Action category present the highest
mean and standard deviation for the production budgets. We also observe
26See www.boxofficemojo.com/about/boxoffice.htm.
27According to The Motion Picture Association (2003), quoted by Hanson and Xiang
(2011, p. 21), “for the average US movie in 2003 65% of total costs were due to film pro-
duction and 35% were due to marketing, which includes making film prints; advertising on
radio, TV, newspapers and other media; and promotional activities.”See also http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Film\_promotion or http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/
movie-cost1.htm.
28Drama corresponds to Mojo category ‘Drama’, Action merges Mojo categories ‘Ac-
tion’, ‘Adventure’, and ‘Western’, Suspense merges ‘Thriller/Suspense’ and ‘Horror’, Com-
edy merges ‘Comedy’, ‘Romantic Comedy’, ‘Black Comedy’ and ‘Cartoons’, and Other
merges ‘Musical, ‘Documentary’, and ‘Concert/Performance’.
29Box Office Mojo reports the following market shares (in box office revenues) for 2013:
Warner Bros. (17.1%), Walt Disney (15.7%), Universal (13.1%), Sony/Columbia (10.5%),
Lions Gate (9.8%), 20th Century Fox (9.7%), Paramount (8.8%), and others (15.3%)
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in Table 2 that the market for American movies varies in size across coun-
tries. Only a little more than 50% of the American movies in our sample
are released in Japan, while this proportion is at least as large as 73% in the
other countries. Interestingly, the average production budget is larger for
movies released outside the U.S and Canada, suggesting that studios choose
not to release small-budget movies abroad (probably because they fear that
they will not be profitable enough).
Obs % Mean Std.-Dev. Min Max
Genre Drama 378 25 30.6 29.3 0.17-(Once) 206.34-(A-Christmas-Carol)
AcGon 417 25 100.9 66.3 4.85-(Night-Watch) 336.9-(Pirates-of-the-Caribbean-3)
Suspense 262 17 36 31.7 0.16-(Paranormal-AcGvity) 170.88-(IncepGon)
Comedy 463 29 45.4 38.4 0.19-(Tadpole) 200-(Monsters-University)
Others 44 4 23.5 28.3 0.08-(Super-Size-me) 96.12-(The-Nutcracker)
Studio Fox 194 12 51.9 47.7 0.17-(Once) 257.4-(Avatar)
Liongate 113 7 28.7 27.8 0.32-(Lovely-and-Amazing) -132-(The-Twilight-Saga-4)
Others 218 14 25.1 26 -0.08-(Super-Size-Me) -183.9-(Die-Another-Day)
Paramount 171 11 70.1 54.7 0.16-(Paranormal-AcGvity) -228-(Transformers-2)
Sony 263 17 52.4 50.3 0.46-(Quinceanera) 289.7-(SpiderYMan-3)
Universal 196 13 58.3 49.2 -.52-(Brick) 246.9--(King-Kong-(2005))
WaltYDisney 177 11 72.7 69.8 0.19-(Tadpole) 336.9-(Pirates-of-the-Caribbean-3)
Warner 232 15 70.3 59.45 2.46-(Before-Sunset) 271.5-(Harry-Po]er-6)
Sequel 194 12 95.9 73.6 2.46-(Before-Sunset) 336.9-(Pirates-of-the-Caribbean-3)
Titles 1564 100 54.4 53.1 0.08-(Super-Size-me) 336.9-(Pirates-of-the-Caribbean-3)
Table 1: Production budgets per genre and per studio
Country Obs %,wrt,.tles Average,budget Std.,Dev.
US,/,Canada 1564 100% 54.4 53.1
Australia 1374 88% 58.7 55.5
France 1316 84% 60,0 55.3
Germany 1337 85% 59.7 55,0
Italy 1308 84% 60.1 55.2
Japan 798 51% 78.8 60,0
N.,Zealand 1223 78% 61.8 56.4
S.,Africa 1152 74% 64.2 56.5
Spain 1401 90% 58.2 54.3
UK 1431 91% 56.9 54.2
Total 12904
Table 2: Production budgets per country of release
Casual observation of our data lends credence to our hypotheses, as
illustrated by Figure 3. This figure plots release dates (on the horizontal
axis) against production budgets (on the vertical axis) for movies released
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Figure 3: Budgets per week and per genre (USA, 2008)
in the US/Canada in 2008; each dot corresponds to one movie and the color
of the dots indicates to which genre the movie belongs; the vertical lines
correspond to the seasonal peaks. We observe that the movies with the
larger budgets are indeed released close to the peaks; we also see that when
several movies are released close to a peak, they usually belong to different
genres and have different budgets (the dots have different colors and are
scattered).
4.2 Specification and results
In the theoretical model of Section 3, we assumed for simplicity that every-
thing was starting at some date t = 1, corresponding to a peak in demand.
In this context, we modeled the trade-off facing studios as choosing between
meeting the demand (i.e., immediate release) and avoiding head-to-head
competition (i.e., delayed release). In reality (as illustrated in the intro-
duction), there is another way to avoid competition, which is to release a
movie before the peak. In our empirical model, we thus need to consider a
symmetric version of our theoretical model, where movies can be released at
a peak or any time before and after. Accordingly, we define our dependent
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variable as the number of weeks (in absolute value) between the release date
of a movie and the closest demand peak :
tik = min |peakweekk − releaseweeki,k| ,
where i identifies the movie and k the country.30
4.2.1 Seasonal peaks
We identify the seasonal peaks in the demand for movies in the various
countries using the following three-step procedure. First, following Mojo,
we consider five seasons: Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall, and the Holiday
Season.31 Second, we use the weekly box office revenue data in each country
to find the share of each week’s revenues in the total annual revenues. Third,
we define a peak as a week that reaches a sum of box-office revenues that is
above the 70th percentile of the seasonal distribution. Table 4 in Appendix
6.7 reports the weeks identified as peaks (by season and by country); note
that it is not rare that two or three consecutive weeks qualify as peaks.
Clearly, this procedure raises an endogeneity issue for our estimations as
shares are equilibrium outcomes that depend both on demand and supply
behavior. Take for instance the summer period. Two reasons may explain
why box-office revenue are higher during this period: people may be more
willing to go to the movies because they are on vacation or long for air-
conditioning (demand effect) and/or because it is precisely the period when
studios have decided to release their more popular movies (supply effect). In
other words, it is not clear whether it is the box-office revenue that drives
30By taking the absolute value, we implicitly assume that studios find it equivalent to
release a movie x weeks before or x weeks after a given peak. Arguably, it may be more
profitable to release a movie before a peak rather than after as the movie will still be on
screen when the demand is the highest (even if the attractiveness of the movie itself will
have faded). On the other hand, there may be very little demand in the weeks immediately
preceding a peak; think, e.g., of the last week of June, preceding the peak of the 4th of July
in the US. As these forces may counterbalance each other, we believe that our assumption
of symmetry around a peak is reasonable.
31Winter goes from the first day after New Year’s week or weekend through the Thursday
before the first Friday in March; Spring goes from the first Friday in March through the
Thursday before the first Friday in May; Summer goes from the first Friday in May
through USA Labor Day Weekend; Fall goes from the day after USA Labor Day Weekend
through the Thursday before the first Friday in November; the Holiday Season goes from
the first Friday in November through New Year’s week or weekend.
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the choice of release dates, or the other way round. Yet, we have two reasons
to believe that endogeneity is not a real concern in our case. First, previous
research has shown that the demand effect largely dominates.32 Second,
by summing box-office revenues for a particular week over 13 years (or less,
depending on data availability), we reduce (if not eliminate) any endogeneity
problem that may exist. Reassuringly, we find the same pattern of movie
sales as Einav (Figure 4, p. 139, 2007) for US/Canada, and as Hand and
Judge (Figure 2, p. 83, 2011) for UK data (see Figure 6 in Appendix 6.7).
4.2.2 Test of hypotheses (H1) and (H2)
To estimate the effects of production budgets and competition on the release
date of a movie, we estimate the following specification:
tik = αk + Tik + β1budgeti + β2nik + β3mik + β4sequeli + β5Xi,k + εik, (5)
where the indices i and k refer, respectively, to movies (i = 1 . . . 1564) and
countries (k = 1 . . . 10), αk is a country fixed effect, Tik is a dummy for the
year of release in country k, budgeti is the production budget of film i, nik
(resp. mik) is the sum of the production budgets of other movies of the same
(resp. a different) genre as movie i and released during the the same week
as movie i in country k, sequelik is a dummy variable that takes value one
if movie i is a sequel of a previously released movie, and Xi,k is a matrix of
controls (season, year, country and studio). The variable sequelik is meant
to capture the fact that sequels benefit from the popularity acquired by the
previous movies in the same series, which may scare off the competition by
itself, regardless of the size of the production budget.
Recalling that a decrease in tik means that the release date moves closer
to the nearest peak, the theoretical prediction stated in hypothesis (H1) lead
us to expect a negative value for β1 (a higher budget is used as a commitment
to release near a demand peak, implying a smaller tik), and negative values
for β2 and β3 (an increase in the total budgets of contemporaneous movies
is taken as a proxy for an increase in the competitive pressure, which should
lead the studio to release the movie closer to the peak, i.e., to a smaller tik).
32Einav (2007) disentangles the endogeneity implicit in the data for the US movie market
and finds that the behavior of demand accounts for about two-thirds of the seasonal
variation in total sales. Cartier and Liarte (2012) perform a similar exercise. Hand and
Judge (2011) find the same evidence for the UK market.
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Moreover, according to hypothesis (H2), we should observe |β2| > |β3|, as
the competitive pressure stemming from movies of the same genre should
be felt more strongly.
We report the results of the OLS estimation of specification (5) in the
first two columns of Table 3, with the variables nik and mik being excluded
in Column (2). We see that the estimated coefficient of budgeti has the
expected negative sign in both specifications; the estimated coefficients of
nik and mik also have the expected sign in specification (2); moreover, all
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also observe in the
first specification that |β2| > |β3|; that is, the aggregate budgets of movies
in the same genre (nik) exert a stronger effect on the release date of a given
movie, compared to the aggregate budgets of all the other movies (mik). A
t-test conducted between the two variables confirms that the difference is
statistically different from zero at the 1% level. We can thus safely say that
hypotheses (H1) and (H2) are verified.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS (no n_ik, m_ik) Poisson OLS (yearly peaks) OLS (USA) OLS (no outliers)
Budget -0.0037 *** -0.0028 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0067 *** -0.0019 * -0.00402 ***
 (-7.88) (-6.08)  (-7.79) (-8.56)  (-1.82)  (-6.51) 
n_ik -0.0037 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0065 *** -0.003*** -0.0032 ***
(-8.09) (-7.30) (-8.35)  (-2.94)  (-7.65) 
m_ik -0.0029 *** -0.001 *** -0.0055 *** -0.003 *** -0.0028 ***
(-11.62) (-10.00) (-12.09)  (-6.39)  (-10.56) 
Sequel -0.0054 0.286 -0.011 -0.044 0.089 0.0032
 (-0.09)  (0.45)  (-0.05)  (0.41)  (0.63)  (-0.05)
Drama 0.147 ** 0.149 ** 0.597 ** -0.494 *** -0.288 0.128 **
(2.53) (2.56) (2.65) (-5.00)   (-0.23) (2.14) 
Action 0.254 0.415 0.144 0.107 -0.222 * -0.0072
 (0.43)  (0.71)  (0.61) (1.04) (-1.71)  (0.12)
Suspense 0.265 *** 0.329 *** 0.098 *** 0.97 -0.127 0.278 ***
(4.12) (5.10) (4.16)  (0.89) (-0.94) (4.21) 
Others 0.133 0.164 0.54 0.399 * -0.494 ** -0.165  
 (1.08) (1.33) (1.07) (1.80)  (-2.13) (4.21)
Comedy (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Constant 2.544 *** 2.08 *** 0.893 *** 4.99 *** 3.307 ***  2.554 ***
(24.71) (21.36) (21.173) (31.07) (31.07)  (23.45) 
Controls (season, year, studio) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
R-squared  0.1195  0.1077  0.1058 0.3346  0.1193
Adj R-squared  0.1173  0.1056 0.1039 0.3246 0.1169
Pseudo R-squared  0.0309
Prob > chi2  0.000
Number of observations 12904 12904 12904 12904 1564 11615
* 0.05 < p < 0.1; ** 0.01 < p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 3: Estimation results
Noteworthy is the fact that the coefficient of the variable sequelik is
never significant. We interpret this finding as follows: even if sequel movies
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may benefit from a head start in terms of popularity, releasing them near de-
mand peaks still requires studios to increase their production and promotion
budgets.33
To provide some economic significance to our estimated coefficient of
interest, we compute from estimation (1) that, everything else constant, a
studio should increase its budget by $38.6 million if it wanted to move the
release date of its movie one day closer to the nearest demand peak.
4.2.3 Robustness checks
We check the robustness of our results in various ways. First, it could be
argued that production budgets may be a proxy for studios’ size and/or
reputation. This could be a concern for our analysis insofar as size and
reputation (which are omitted from the regression model) could affect both
studios’ ability to release movies closer to demand peaks and the way studios
set production budgets. Another argument could be that the largest studios
strive to release movies around demand peaks every year so as to assert their
presence on the market, irrespective of the movies’ budgets. It is to assess
this possibility that we have introduced eight binary variables to control
for movie studios in our regressions. It turns out that the effects of these
controls are not significant, which leads us to think that they have no impact
on the dependent variable.34
Second, we propose a Poisson regression model (Maddala, 1983). Pois-
son distributed data is intrinsically integer-valued, which makes sense for
count data as in our case. Since the dependent variable has a restricted sup-
port, OLS regression could predict values that are negative and non-integer
values, which have no sense. Furthermore, OLS assumes that true values
are normally distributed around the expected value. So, Poisson regression
models perform better in far from normal distributed data. We present the
results of this estimation in the third column of Table 3. We observe that
the Poisson regression of Column (3) and the OLS regression of Column (1)
give very similar results.
33We observe in Table 1 that sequel movies are characterized by rather large budgets:
the mean budget for sequel movies is $95.9 million, whereas the mean budget for all movies
in our sample is $54.4 million.
34We also run our main OLS regression after dropping the group of small studios; we
did not observe any significant change in our results.
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As a third robustness check, we modified our dependent variable by iden-
tifying demand peaks in a different way: a week is now defined as a peak if
it reaches a sum of box-office revenues that is above the 70th percentile of
the distribution of a given year instead of a given season. This changes the
distribution of peaks in two conflicting ways: when compared over a whole
year, some ‘big’ weeks within ‘small’ seasons go out (e.g., in the spring),
whereas some ‘big’ weeks within ‘big’ seasons come in (e.g., in the summer).
These changes are depicted for each country in Table 5 in Appendix 6.7. We
regress the newly defined dependent variable over the same set of indepen-
dent variables as in specification (5). The results are reported in the fourth
column of Table 3. We observe that all the coefficients of interest continue
to have the expected sign and remain highly significant. The relationship
between budgets and release dates seems thus to exist irrespective of the
way we define the demand peaks. This suggests that studios compete in
terms of release dates not only within each season but also over the whole
year.
Finally, we ran the OLS regression only for the US to control for the
possibility that the release date in other countries could be a function of the
viewership (or profits) in the US given the release date chosen there. Appar-
ently, this is not so as the results in Column (5) of Table 3 are qualitatively
similar to those reported in Column (1). We also repeated our main OLS
regression after winsorizing our data (we dropped the movies corresponding
to the lowest 5% and highest 5% in the budget distribution); the estimated
coefficients, reported in Column (6) of Table 3, are qualitatively similar to
those reported in Column (1), which indicates that our results are not driven
by outliers.
4.2.4 Test of hypothesis (H3)
As suggested in Figure 3, the distribution of movie budgets seems to vary
a lot week per week. In particular, for weeks at or near a demand peak,
the largest budget is higher and the distribution is more dispersed. This
observation is consistent with the predictions of our model: higher budgets
allow studios to release their movies closer to a peak and to scare off the
competition. It is thus unlikely to observe two movies with high budgets
released around a peak (especially if they belong to the same genre). As a
result, movies coexisting in weeks near a peak should have very dissimilar
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budgets (very high or very low). Conversely, in weeks further away from
peaks, the distribution of budgets should be more concentrated and with a
lower mean.
To check this hypothesis, we have categorized movies (across countries
and years) according to the number of weeks that separate their release
from the nearest peak. We have then computed the mean and the standard
deviation of the production budgets for the movies within each category.
To verify hypothesis (H3), we should observe that both the mean and the
standard deviation decrease as we move to categories of movies that are
more distant from a peak.
Figure 4 plots the mean of the standard deviation of the production
budgets (vertical axis) against the number of weeks separating the release
date from the nearest peak (horizontal axis); the latter variable takes values
from 0 to 9. As expected, we observe that both variables decrease as movies
are released further from a peak. This observation suggests that hypothesis
(H3) is verified.
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Figure 4: Mean and standard deviation of budgets according to release date
4.3 Discussion
We discuss here a number of concerns that our approach could raise. We
also indicate how we have already addressed some of them and how we plan
to address others in future work.
Movies released by the same studio. Major film studios typically re-
lease about 15 to 20 movies per year. Inevitably, several movies are then
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released within a given season, and these movies may be of the same genre
and have similar budgets. This is illustrated on Figure 5, which depicts
the movies that 20th Century Fox released in the U.S. in 2008 (weeks are
reported on the horizontal axis and genres on the vertical axis; the size of a
dot is proportional to the size of the budget of the corresponding movie).
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Figure 5: Movie releases by Fox in the U.S. in 2008
Clearly, each studio coordinates the budget and release decisions for its
movies. We need thus to assess how this possibility affects our analysis.
From a theoretical viewpoint, we can analyze the promotion and release
decisions of a monopoly studio that produces and distributes two movies,
and compare the results to the ones that we obtained in the duopoly model
of Section 3. In Appendix 6.6, we show that simultaneous release emerges
for a wider configuration of parameters under a multi-movie monopoly than
under a duopoly. Moreover, when the monopoly studio decides to release
both movies at date t = 1, we show that it chooses a lower budget than
independent studios do (i.e., bi = (1 − β)v1/γ instead of bi = v1/γ). In
contrast, when the monopoly studio opts for staggered releases, the chosen
dates and budgets are exactly the same as in the duopoly case. The previous
analysis suggests that the difference between coordinated (i.e., multi-movie
monopoly) and independent (i.e., duopoly) decisions should only be minor
and observed for a restricted set of parameters. Moreover, if we transpose
these results to an oligopoly setting, i.e., if we add to our setting the compe-
tition resulting from other (multi-movie) studios, the impact of coordinated
decisions can only be weaker. We therefore believe that the fact that the
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same studio releases several movies during a given season does not affect our
results in any significant way.
Rescheduling. In our model, studios choose the release date of their
movie once-and-for-all at the start of the game. The choices are supposed
to be simultaneous, which is to say that no studio can observe the choice of
the other studio before making its own. This is clearly a simplification as in
reality, it happens that studios modify their initial decision and reschedule
the release of their movies. For instance, Einav (2010, p. 380) observes that
in his dataset,35 “more than 60% of the movies changed their release dates
at least once.” Although some of these changes may be due to internal rea-
sons (e.g., unforeseen production delays), it is widely believed that most of
them are done for strategic reasons, i.e., as a reaction to current or expected
competition. In support for this view, Du¨rr et al. (2014) estimate36 that
“movies which have been rescheduled and therefore observed the market
conditions very carefully, were able to avoid competition and thus achieved
better results at the box office.” This finding suggests the presence of a
second-mover advantage that our simple model fails to capture. Yet, the
key concern for our analysis is whether sequential release decisions would
challenge our result that higher production budgets are used to scare off
competition and secure the most profitable release dates. Einav (2010, p.
380) gives us some reassurance in this regard by noting that: “The likelihood
of a movie changing its release date is not significantly correlated with the
movie’s size, measured by its production cost.” Our analysis appears thus
as a reasonable approximation. It would, however, be interesting to enrich
our model by allowing studios to change their release date at some cost.37
International differences. Our dataset spans 10 countries but focuses
on the release of American movies only. As a result, in non U.S. markets, we
miss the competition that (unobserved) popular local movies exert on (ob-
served) American movies. As anecdotal evidence, it appeared that Chinese
authorities delayed the release of Skyfall (a James Bond movie) by more
35His dataset contains all movies released in the U.S. between 1985 and 1999.
36Their dataset contains 634 movies released in the U.S. between 2007 and 2013.
37According to Einav (2010, p. 380), the costs associated with changing a release
date can stem from “committed advertising slots, the implicit costs of reoptimizing the
advertising campaign, reputational costs, etc.”
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than three months with respect to the original release date, because an ear-
lier release could have overshadowed the release of two big-budget Chinese
films.38 To account for such local competition we should definitely extend
our dataset. For now, the potential influence of local movies is picked up
in our regressions by the country fixed effects. Countries also differ accord-
ing to the distribution of peaks along the year (because holidays, weather
conditions and/or patterns of movie consumption vary across countries).
However, this does not affect our estimations as peaks are defined country
per country, which takes care of local specificities.
Note that all our specifications are based on the assumption that country
effects are fixed through the whole analysis period. As this could be seen as
a restrictive assumption, we also tried an alternative model with different
effects per country and per year. Yet, we did not observe any significant
difference in the estimated parameters.39
Definition of genres. The degree of substitutability across movies (mea-
sured by the parameter β) plays an important role in our theoretical model.
We approach it in the empirical analysis by classifying movies into differ-
ent genres. There are two potential weaknesses in this strategy. First, our
classification may be a bit arbitrary as we have merged distinct Mojo gen-
res to form categories of relatively equal sizes. Although we have merged
genres that looked relatively similar, we are not sure that the degree of
substitutability is always higher across than within our categories. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, recent developments in the motion picture
industry indicate that the boundaries between various genres may start to
blur. In particular, genres that used to be rather immune to competition
like animated films are increasingly facing the competition of other genres,
for instance superhero films.40 Finally, as suggested by Cartier and Liarte
(2012), demand peaks may also differ across genres (for instance, the de-
mand for animated movies is more likely to peak during the Festive Season,
when more families with young children go to theaters). In future work, we
plan to check if our results still hold if we run our estimations under different
38See www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/skyfall-china-release-date-pushed-389769,
last consulted March 2015.
39The estimation results of this model are omitted here for the sake of brevity.
40See, e.g., http://tinyurl.com/mdmqpdt (last consulted March 2015) where Jeffrey
Katzenberg explains how Marvel is Dreamworks new competition.
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groupings of the MOJO genres, or if we estimate demand peaks per genre.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyzed how producers of cultural goods can use strategi-
cally the size of the promotion budget of their good to scare off competition
so as to secure a release date close to a demand peak. To this end, we built
a simple game-theoretic model where two producers compete along two di-
mensions: promotion budget and release date. We showed that two types of
subgame-perfect equilibria can emerge: simultaneous release (both produc-
ers choose high promotion budgets and release their good at the start of the
period, which corresponds to the peak of demand) or staggered release (one
producer chooses a high promotion budget and releases its good at the start
of the period, while the other producer chooses a lower budget and releases
its good later). The latter equilibrium is more likely when goods are close
substitutes (e.g., because they belong to the same genre).
We then applied the model to the motion picture industry, using a
dataset of 1564 American movies released in 10 countries from 2001 to 2013.
This allowed us to verify the predictions that we could draw from the theo-
retical model, namely that (i) higher budgets explain release dates closer to
a demand peak, (ii) release dates are more sensitive to the budgets of close
competitors than of distant competitors, and (iii) the mean and standard
deviation of the budget distribution are both higher in weeks closer to a
demand peak.
Besides the extension already mentioned in the previous section, it would
be interesting in future research to test the predictions of our theoretical
model for other cultural goods (e.g., books or video games).
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We show that the segments pia, pib, and pid decrease with ti, while segment
pic reaches its largest value at one of the extremities of the zone where it is
defined (i.e., at either ti = tj or ti = tj + s).
pi′a = pi
′
d = (1 + bi)
(−t−αi + (ti + s)−α) < 0,
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pi′b = − (1 + bi) t−αi + (1 + bi − βbj) (ti + s)−α < 0.
As for segment pic, we compute:
pi′c = − (1 + bi − βbj) t−αi + (1 + bi) (ti + s)−α ,
pi′′c = α
(
(1 + bi − βbj) t−α−1i − (1 + bi) (ti + s)−α−1
)
.
If pi′c = 0, then (1 + bi − βbj) = (1 + bi) (ti + s)−α tαi . We have then that
pi′′c = αs (1 + bi) (ti + s)
−α−1 /ti > 0. Hence, either pic decreases or increases
with ti on the whole range ti ∈ [tj , tj + s], or it has an interior minimum.
That is, the largest value of pic is reached either at ti = tj or at ti = tj + s.
In the former case, the whole profit function reaches its maximum at ti = 1;
in the latter case, it reaches its maximum at either at ti = 1 or at ti = tj +s.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, t∗i (tj) = 1 or t
∗
i (tj) = tj+s. As tj ≥ 1+s, the former option
brings producer i in profit segment pia. To establish the result, we thus need
to show that pia (1, tj) > pic (tj + s, tj). Developing the latter inequality, we
have{
1
1−α
(
(1 + s)1−α − 1
)
> 11−α
(
(tj + 2s)
1−α − (tj + s)1−α
)
for α 6= 1,
ln (1 + s) > ln (tj + 2s)− ln (tj + s) for α = 1.
.
Let x ≡ tj+s, f (x) ≡ 11−α
(
(x+ s)1−α − x1−α
)
, and g (x) ≡ ln (x+ s)−lnx
We compute that f ′ (x) = (x+ s)−α−x−α < 0 and g′ (x) = −s/ (x (s+ x)) <
0, which implies that the above inequality is correct and completes the proof.
6.3 Justification of β0 > 1/2
On average, it is reported that 40% of box-office revenues are secured during
the the first week of exploitation of a movie. In our setting, this observation
translates into∫ 2
1
τ−αdτ = 410
∫ 1+s
1
τ−αdτ ⇔ 1 + s = (104 (21−α − 610)) 11−α .
It is also reported that a movie is exploited during 6 to 8 weeks on average.
Let us thus solve the above equation for s ∈ {6, 7, 8}. This will give us
a value of α that we can then use, with the corresponding value of s, to
compute β0. The results of these computations are reported in the following
33
table, where it is observed that the value of β0 is larger than 1/2 in all
three instances. That allows us to conclude that the observation of 40% of
revenues during the first week safely allows us to reject values of β0 lower
than 1/2.
s α (s) β0
6 1.193 0.753
7 1.281 0.796
8 1.344 0.826
6.4 Proof of Lemma 3
We compute:
piim1 −pid1 =
γ
2β2
− (β2 (2β − 1) + β0 (2β − β0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
v21
γ2
− 2β0 (β − β0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
v1
γ
+ β20

So, piim1 ≥ pid1 if the polynomial in v1/γ in the bracket is positive. Given the
signs of the different terms and given that
(β0 (β − β0))2 +
(
β2 (2β − 1) + β0 (2β − β0)
)
β20 = 2β
3β20 ,
we have that the polynomial is positive if
v1
γ
≤ β0 (β − β0)−
√
2β3β20
− (β2 (2β − 1) + β0 (2β − β0)) = β0
β
√
2β − (β − β0)
β2 (2β − 1) + β0 (2β − β0) ,
which completes the proof.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 4
We first show that if condition (3) is met, then producer 1’s best response to
b2 = vs/γ is b1 = v1/γ. We already know that b1 = v1/γ is a best response
locally (i.e., as long as (1, 1 + s) remains the ensuing equilibrium). Clearly,
producer 1 cannot increase its profit by forcing the second-stage equilib-
rium to become (1 + s, 1). The only meaningful deviation is to reduce b1 so
that the second-stage equilibrium becomes (1, 1). In that case, producer 1’s
problem is
max
b1
(
1 + b1 − β vs
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
b21 s.t. b1 ≤
β0
β
(
1 +
vs
γ
)
.
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The optimum is b1 = v1/γ. Although we know that this value does not meet
the constraint, let us suppose that it does for the sake of the demonstration.
In this hypothetical case, producer 1’s achieves the largest possible deviation
profit, given by
pid1 =
(
1 +
v1
γ
− β vs
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
(
v1
γ
)2
.
Clearly, the deviation is not profitable even in this best-case scenario. We
compute indeed that
pist1 − pid1 = βv1
vs
γ
> 0.
Consider now producer 2. As indicated in the text, a first condition
for (b1, b2) = (v1/γ, vs/γ) to lead to second-stage equilibrium release dates
(t1, t2) = (1, 1 + s) is condition (3), which can be rewritten as (by using
vs = (1− β0) vi and solving)
v1
γ
≥ β0
β
(
1 +
vs
γ
)
⇔ v1
γ
≥ β0
β20 + β − β0
(6)
As shown on Figure 3, a condition for the deviation to (1, 1 + s) to be
feasible is β0/β < (β − β0) /β, which is equivalent to β > 12(1 +
√
5)β0 '
0.618β0. We therefore distinguish between two cases.
(A) If β0 < β ≤ 12(1 +
√
5)β0, the only possible deviation for producer 2
is to change the second-stage equilibrium to (1, 1). The necessary condition
for such deviation is (1 + b2)β0 ≥ β v1γ , or b2 ≥ ββ0 v1γ − 1. If the ensuing
equilibrium is (1, 1), producer 2 would optimally choose b2 = v1/γ. This
value meets the latter condition if and only if v1γ ≥ ββ0 v1γ − 1 or v1γ ≤
β0
β−β0 ,
which is compatible with condition (6). In that case, producer 2’s profit is
pid2 =
(
1 + (1− β) v1
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
(
v1
γ
)2
.
We compute then
pist2 − pid2 =
1
2
v1
((
β20 + 2 (β − β0)
) v1
γ
− 2β0
)
.
Hence, the deviation is not profitable if pist2 ≥ pid2 or
v1
γ
≥ 2β0
β20 + 2 (β − β0)
. (7)
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where we check that the latter fraction is smaller than β0β−β0 and larger
than the RHS in (6). It is thus a necessary condition for a subgame-perfect
equilibrium with staggered release.
Suppose now that v1γ >
β0
β−β0 . Producer 2 is constrained; the best it can
choose is bd2 =
β
β0
v1
γ − 1. The deviation profit becomes
pidb2 =
(
1 +
(
β
β0
v1
γ
− 1
)
− β v1
γ
)
v1 − γ
2
(
β
β0
v1
γ
− 1
)2
We compute
pist2 − pidb2 =
1
2
(−γβ0 + βv1 − β0v1 + β20v1)2
γβ20
> 0,
which shows that the deviation is not profitable in this case.
(B) Consider now the case where 12(1 +
√
5)β0 ≤ β ≤ 2β0. Condition
(7) remains necessary to make sure that producer 2 does not deviate so as
to change the second-stage equilibrium to (1, 1). Compared to the previous
case, there is now an additional possibility of deviation, which consists in
changing the second-stage equilibrium to (1 + s, 1). For this deviation to be
feasible, it must be the case (see Figure 3) that v1/γ < (β − β0) /β0. But, we
have just argued that condition (7) remains necessary. We now show that if
(7) is satisfied, then v1/γ > (β − β0) /β0, making the deviation to (1 + s, 1)
impossible. Suppose not. Then
β − β0
β0
>
2β0
β20 + 2 (β − β0)
,
which implies that
β >
1
4
(
4− β0 + β0
√
β20 + 16
)
≡ βˆ.
But that leads to a contradiction as βˆ > 1 for all admissible β0 and β ≤ 1
by definition.
We therefore conclude that only the deviation to (1, 1) is feasible and it
is not profitable if condition (7) holds, which completes the proof.
6.6 Multiproduct monopoly
To be able to compare the monopoly and duopoly situations, we continue to
assume an exogenous degree of substitutability between the two goods (i.e.,
β).41 Clearly, the monopolist chooses to release at least one good at date
41Arguably, a monopoly producer is also able to choose the degree of good differentia-
tion, insofar as it can avoid to release goods of the same genre during the same period.
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t = 1 (there is indeed nothing to be gained by delaying the release of the
two goods). By the same token, the producer will release the second good
no later than date t = 1 + s. The monopolist’s problem is thus to choose b1,
b2 and t2 so as to maximize its total profits on the two goods:
Πm =
∫ t2
1
(1 + b1) τ
−αdτ +
∫ 1+s
t2
(2 + (1− β) (b1 + b2)) τ−αdτ
+
∫ t2+s
1+s
(1 + b2) τ
−αdτ − γ
2
(
b21 + b
2
2
)
,
s.t. 0 ≤ b1, b2 ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1 + s.
Deriving profit with respect to b1 and b2 gives
∂Πm
∂b1
=
∫ t2
1
τ−αdτ + (1− β)
∫ 1+s
t2
τ−αdτ − γb1 = 0
⇔ b∗1 (t2) = 1γ
(
t1−α2 −1
1−α + (1− β)
(1+s)1−α−t1−α2
1−α
)
∂Πm
∂b2
= (1− β)
∫ 1+s
t2
τ−αdτ +
∫ t2+s
1+s
τ−αdτ − γb2 = 0
⇔ b∗2 (t2) = 1γ
(
(t2+s)
1−α−(1+s)1−α
1−α + (1− β)
(1+s)1−α−t1−α2
1−α
)
Deriving profit with respect to t2 gives
∂Πm
∂t2
= (1 + b1) t
−α
2 + (1 + b2) (t2 + s)
−α − (2 + (1− β) (b1 + b2)) t−α2
= β (b1 + b2) t
−α
2 − (1 + b2)
(
t−α2 − (t2 + s)−α
)
.
Substituting b∗1 (t2) and b∗2 (t2) for b1 and b2, we have an expression that
depends only on t2 and on the parameters. Deriving again with respect to
t2, we can try to establish the sign of ∂
2Πm/∂t22. Unfortunately, we have
not found any simple analytical way to do so. However, a large number
of numerical simulations consistently show that ∂2Πm/∂t22 > 0, suggesting
that the producer’s profit is convex in t2. If so, the optimal release date
for the second good is either t2 = 1 or t2 = 1 + s. Let us compare the
two options. If t2 = 1, then b
∗
1 (1) = b
∗
2 (1) =
1
γ (1− β) v1 and Πm (1) =
(v1/γ) (2γ+v1 (1− β)2). If t2 = 1+s, then b∗1 (1 + s) = 1γ v1, b∗2 (1 + s) = 1γ vs
and Πm (1 + s) = (1/2γ)
(
v21 + v
2
s + 2γv1 + 2γvs
)
. Then, the optimum is
t∗2 = 1 if an only if Πm (1) ≥ Πm (1 + s), which is equivalent to
v1
γ
≤ 2β0
2β (1− β) + 2 (β − β0) + β20
.
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It can be shown that the RHS of the latter condition is larger than the
RHS in Condition (2), meaning that simultaneous release emerges for a
wider configuration of parameters under a multi-good monopoly than under
a duopoly.
6.7 Additional tables and figures
Winter'(1*8) Spring'(9*17) Summer'(18*34) Fall'(35*42) Holiday'(43*52)
Australia 1/2 15/16 26/27/28 39/40 52
France 7/8 9 28/29 42 51/52
Germany 1/2'*'5/6/7 9 20/21'*'29/30 40 51/52
Italy 1/2/3 10/11 20 37'*'42 51/52
Japan 4 16 18'*'28/29/30/31/32/33 37 50/51
New'Zealand 1/2 16 26/27/28/29 40 47'*'52
South'Africa 1 12/13/14/15 26/27/28/29 39/40 48/49/50/51
Spain 1'*'6/7 10 32 41 47/48/49'*'51/52
US'/'Canada 7 14 21'*'26/27/28 35 51/52
UK 1'*'7 14 21'*'28/29/30 42 43/44'*'46/47
Table 4: Weeks qualifying as peaks (seasonal basis)
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Figure 6: Estimated seasonal peaks (left: US/Canada (left); right: UK)
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Winter'(1*8) Spring'(9*17) Summer'(18*34) Fall'(35*42) Holiday'(43*52)
Australia 1/2/3/4 23'*'26/27/28/29 40 52
1/2 15/16 26/27/28 39/40 52
France 5/6/7/8/9 43/44'*'48/49'*51/52
7/8 9 28/29 42 51/52
Germany 1 20/21'*'29/30/31 40 46/47'*'51/52
1/2'*'5/6/7 9 20/21'*'29/30 40 51/52
Italy 1/2/3/4/5 10 44'*'47/48'*'51/52
1/2/3 10/11 20 37'*'42 51/52
Japan 16 18'*'27/28/29/30/31/32/33 50/51
4 16 18'*'28/29/30/31/32/33 37 50/51
New'Zealand 1/2 16 21'*'25/26/27/28/29/30 52
1/2 16 26/27/28/29 40 47'*'52
South'Africa 1 14 18'*'26/27/28/29/30 39 48'*'51
1 12/13/14/15 26/27/28/29 39/40 48/49/50/51
Spain 1'*'4/5/6/7 41 47/48/49'*'51/52
1'*'6/7 10 32 41 47/48/49'*'51/52
US'/'Canada 21'*'25/26/27/28729/30/31 47'*'51/52
7 14 21'*'26/27/28 35 51/52
UK 7 21'*'27/28/29/30/31/32 46/47
1'*'7 14 21'*'28/29/30 42 43/44'*'46/47
For'each'country,'the'ﬁrst'(second)'line'indicates'the'weeks'qualiﬁed'as'peaks'on'a'yearly'(season)'basis
Table 5: Weeks qualifying as peaks (yearly basis)
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